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COMMENT 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS v. 
LUNGREN: CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL 
CONSENT TO ABORTION STATUTE AND 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
This scheme forces a young woman in an al-
ready dire situation to choose between two fun-
damentally unacceptable alternatives: notifying 
a possibly dictatorial or even abusive parent and 
justifying her profoundly personal decision in an 
intimidating judicial proceeding to a black-robed 
stranger. For such a woman, this dilemma is 
more likely to result in trauma and pain than in 
an informed and voluntary decision. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,2 hereinaf-
ter American Academy of Pediatrics II,3 the First District 
1. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 479 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
2. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (per Stein, J; the other panel members were Newsom, Acting P.J., and 
Dossee, J.), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The American 
Academy of Pediatrics is a group of health care providers. Other named plaintifT-
respondents include the California Medical Association and the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Defendant-appellant Daniel E. Lungren was the 
Attorney General for the State of California at the time of publication. District 
Attorneys for all counties in California are also named defendant-appellants. 
3. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (Ct. 
App. 1989), remanded sub nom. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 
884-574, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 
1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 
463 
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Court of Appeal of California unanimously held that 
California's parental consent law for minors seeking abortions4 
Sept. 29, 1994). Because this case was previously heard at the California Court of 
Appeal with the name American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. 
Rptr. 46 (Ct. App. 1989), see infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text, the earlier 
case (263 Cal. Rptr. 46), will be referred to as American Academy of Pediatrics I, 
and the instant case will be referred to as American Academy of Pediatrics II. 
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1995). In significant 
portion, the parental consent statute reads: 
1d. 
(a) Except in a medical emergency requiring immediate 
medical action, no abortion shall be performed upon an 
unemancipated minor unless she first has given her writ-
ten consent to the abortion and also has obtained the 
written consent of one of her parents or legal guardian. 
(b) If one or both of an unemancipated, pregnant minor's 
parents or her guardian refuse to consent to the perfor-
mance of an abortion, or if the minor elects not to seek 
the consent of one or both of her parents or her guardian, 
an unemancipated pregnant minor may file a petition 
with the juvenile court . . . . The hearing shall be set 
within three days of the filing of the petition . . . . 
(c) At the hearing on a minor's petition brought pursuant 
to subdivision (b) for the authorization of an abortion, the 
court shall consider all evidence duly presented, and order 
either of the following: 
(1) If the court finds that the minor is sufficiently 
mature and sufficiently informed to make the deci-
sion on her own regarding an abortion, and that 
the minor has, on that basis, consented thereto, the 
court shall grant the petition. 
(2) If the court finds that the minor is not suffi-
ciently mature and sufficiently informed to make 
the decision on her own regarding an abortion, the 
court shall then consider whether performance of 
the abortion would be in the best interest of the 
minor. In the event that the court finds that the 
performance of the abortion would be in the minor's 
best interest, the court shall grant the petition 
ordering the performance of the abortion without 
consent of, or notice to, the parents or guardian. In 
the event that the court finds that the performance 
of the abortion is not in the best interest of the 
minor, the court shall deny the petition .... 
(0 It is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more 
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in 
the county jail of up to 30 days, or both, for any person 
to knowingly perform an abortion on an unmarried or 
unemancipated minor without complying with the require-
ments of this section. 
2
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is unconstitutiona1.5 The court of appeal found that the paren-
tal consent law violates the right to privacy explicitly guaran-
teed by the California Con$titution.6 
In evaluating the constitutionality of the statute, the court 
of appeal applied a test recently mandated by the California 
Supreme Court for all right to privacy cases.7 The court of 
appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court and sustained a 
permanent injunction against enforcement of the parental 
consent law. 8 The decision confirmed that minors share in the 
protections of the California Constitution's right to privacy.9 
Nevertheless, in late September, 1994, the California Supreme 
Court granted the State's petition requesting review of the 
court of appeal's decision. 10 
This comment will discuss the background right to privacy 
jurisprudence,11 examine the grounds under which the court 
of appeal decided the case,12 and review appellants>l3 and 
respondents' arguments. 14 Based upon the opposing parties' 
arguments and controlling precedent, the author will explain 
why the California Supreme Court should affirm the court of 
appeal's decision.15 
5. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548. 
6. ld. at 555. 
7. The court of appeal followed the analysis set forth in Hill v. NCAA, 865 
P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). Hill involved a claim by a college athlete that her right to 
privacy under the California Constitution was violated by mandatory drug testing 
policies of the NCAA. The California Supreme Court held that it was improper for 
all right to privacy cases to be analyzed under a compelling interest standard. In· 
stead, the supreme court devised a three-step balancing test to determine whether 
a violation of the right to privacy is justified. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 654-56. See 
infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of Hill on 
American Academy of Pediatrics 11. 
8. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. 
9. See id. at 549. 
10. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, review granted, 
882 P.2d 247 (per Lucas, C.J., Kennard, J., Arabian, J., and Baxter, J.) (Cal. Sept. 
29, 1994). 
11. See infra notes 37-88 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 91-123 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 125-179 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 181-222 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 223-274 and accompanying text. 
3
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS II 
In 1987, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 
2274.16 The bill required a minor seeking an abortion to ob-
tain the written consent of one of her parents. 17 In the alter-
native, the minor could petition the juvenile court for permis-
sion to proceed with the abortion. 18 If the court determined 
that the minor was sufficiently mature to decide on her own 
whether to obtain an abortion, the court would be required to 
grant permission.19 If however, the court found the minor to 
be too immature to make the decision, the court would make it 
for her.20 
The newly enacted statute was challenged immediately by 
a group of health care providers and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union.21 These groups argued that the parental consent 
requirement violated California's constitutional guarantee of 
privacy.22 
16. 1987 Cal. Stat. 1237 (amending CAL. Cw. CODE § 34.5 and adding CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1995)). See supra note 4 for rele-
vant text from the parental consent statute. 
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(a) (West Supp. 1995). See supra 
note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute. 
18. Id. § 25958(b). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental con-
sent statute. 
19. Id. § 25958(c)(1). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental con-
sent statute. 
20. Id. § 25958(c)(2). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental con-
sent statute. 
21. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 
(Ct. App. 1989), remanded sub nom. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 
No. 884-574, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr 2d 546 (Ct. App. 
1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal. 
App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. I, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 
Sept. 29, 1994). See supra note 3 for an explanation of the titles used to describe 
the two appearances of this case before the First District Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia. 
The American Civil Liberties Union is a public interest group involved with 
issues concerning constitutional protections. 
22. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 51 n.5. Plaintiffs 
asserted that the statute violated rights to informational and autonomy privacy, as 
well as the right to equal protection. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 app. 
4
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The superior court granted a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of the statute,23 and the State appealed. 
The court of appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction and " 
remanded the case to superior court to determine if the statute 
met the strictures of California's Constitution.24 The court of 
appeal instructed the superior court that the state could justify 
any infringement of the fundamental right to privacy only if 
the parental consent statute furthered a compelling interest.25 
This interest must be one in which "the utility of imposing the 
conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment 
of constitutional rights.,,26 Finally, the court of appeal re-
quired that there be no less burdensome alternatives to the 
statute.27 
On remand, the State asserted several interests. Specifi-
cally, the trial court considered whether the statute furthered 
state interests in "the medical, emotional and psychological 
welfare of minors .... [Other stated interests included] reduc-
ing the teenage pregnancy rate, and ... preserving and foster-
ing the parent-child relationship."28 The trial court found that 
while the state's interests were all compelling, the statute 
failed to further any of them.29 In fact, the court found the 
legislation would injure most of these interests, if it had any 
impact on them at all.30 . 
23. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 47. 
24. See id. at 54. The court of appeal noted that the California Constitution 
affords more protection for privacy than the United States Constitution: "Since the 
time of its enactment, California's constitutional right to privacy has been recog-
nized as being broader than the federal right." Id. at 51. 
25. See id. at 54. 
26. Id. at 55 (quoting Bagley v. Washington, 421 P.2d 409, 415 (Cal. 1966)). 
27. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 55. 
28. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 550 (Ct. 
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
29. See id. 
30. See id. The trial court admitted evidence that minors suffer no more, and 
often less long-term psychological harm from obtaining an abortion than do adults. 
See id. at 559-62 app. Furthermore, the trial court found, the alternative to abor-
tion, bringing the pregnancy to term, is statistically more dangerous to the minor 
than abortion. See id. The court also found that requiring minors to get parental 
permission would increase the physical and emotional danger to the minor. See id. 
The court heard evidence that a minor confessing her pregnancy to her parents is 
often subject to physical and emotional violence in the home. See id. According to 
the evidence at trial, the delay involved in going through the judicial process, as 
an alternative to obtaining parents' permission, also increases the danger to the 
5
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Based upon these findings, the trial court held that the 
statute violates the right to privacy found in Article I, section 1 
of the California Constitution.31 Thus, the court permanently 
enjoined enforcement of the statute.32 On appeal, the court of 
appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court, thereby up-
holding the permanent injunction.33 The State filed a petition 
for review, which the California Supreme Court granted.34 At 
the time of this writing, the parties were completing briefing, 
and the date for oral argument had not yet been determined. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The opposing parties in American Academy of Pediatrics II 
hold widely disparate views of the applicable law governing the 
case. Appellants argue that the standards promulgated by the 
United States Supreme Court should guide the California 
Supreme Court's determination of the statute's validity.35 Re-
spondents contend that the case must be decided by examining 
precedents of California courts interpreting the California 
Constitution.36 A brief discussion of the background of these 
two perspectives underscores the ideological gulf separating 
minor; the longer the pregnancy progresses, the more dangerous obtaining an abor-
tion becomes. See id. 
31. See id. at 550. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the "Privacy Initiative;" the California Constitution's explicit right to priva-
cy. . 
32. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. (Cal. 
Super. Ct. June 5, 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994), modified, 94 
C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The 
trial court also ruled that the statute violates the right to informational privacy 
and equal protection. See id. at 30, 39. 
33. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. 
34. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, review granted, 
882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
35. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review granted, 882 
P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants argue: "[T)he appropriate 
standard against which to measure parental involvement in an unemancipated 
minor's abortion decision making is the significant state interest." [d. 
36. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy 
of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627). Respondents argue: "California Courts have long 
recognized a special duty to construe California's constitutional provisions indepen-
dent of any comparable federal rights, especially in the area of individual liber-
ties." [d. 
6
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the parties' positions. 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
The modern history of federal abortion cases began in 
1973, with Roe v. Wade. 37 In Roe, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that any statute prohibiting women from obtaining 
an abortion prior to the viability of the fetus violates their 
right to privacy under the United States Constitution.3s This 
ruling invalidated the abortion law in Texas, as well as similar 
laws in many other states.39 
Several states reacted to Roe's broad holding by passing 
legislation concerning peripheral abortion issues, such as wait-
ing periods,40 spousal notification,41 and parental consent.42 
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, a pregnant woman challenged a Texas statute 
that prohibited obtaining or performing abortions for any reason other than pro-
tecting the life of the mother. The Court reproduced the statute, in significant 
portion, which read: 
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant 
woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her 
consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her 
any violence or means whatever externally or internally 
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be 
confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more 
than five years . . . . 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (West 1968». 
38. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. The Court noted that there is no explicit right 
of privacy in the United States Constitution. [d. at 152. Instead, the Court cited 
the rights to privacy that have been found to implicitly exist in both the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments: 
[d. at 153. 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and re-
strictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy. 
39. See id. at 118 n.2 for a list of other abortion statutes which were over· 
turned or otherwise aifectedby Roe's holding. 
40. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
311.726 (Baldwin 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1993). 
41. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.8-2 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735 
(Baldwin 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1989). 
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21·4 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 515 . 
7
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Through its analysis of cases challenging these statutes, the 
Court more closely defined the scope of the right to privacy as 
it applies to abortion.43 Without overturning Roe, the Court 
thus narrowed a woman's privacy right to obtain an abor-
tion." Although the right to obtain an abortion prior to the 
viability of the fetus remained, the Court had opened the door 
for restrictive state legislation in peripheral areas. 
1. Parental Consent Statutes 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the United States Supreme 
Court heard a series of cases involving parental consent stat-
utes.45 In the first of these cases, Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
Missouri v. Danforth,46 the Court struck down a parental con-
sent statute,47 holding that "[c]onstitutional rights do not ma-
ture and come into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of majority."48 The Court found that the 
(Smith· Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16·34·2·4 (Bums 1993). 
43. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 
(1983) (waiting period); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mis80uri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal 
notification). 
44. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 
(1983) (waiting period); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal 
notification). 
45. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976). 
46. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri and two phy· 
sicians whose practice included performing abortions challenged the Missouri stat· 
ute. See id. at 56. 
47. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon 1978). The statute provided a crim· 
inal penalty for physicians performing abortions, other than those abortions which 
were required to protect the life of the mother. The statute also required that the 
spouse of the woman seeking an abortion give written consent for the abortion 
and "the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if 
the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years . ... " Id. (emphasis 
added). 
48. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. Regarding the spousal consent provision, the 
Court held that the state could not give the spouse such a unilateral veto: "[WJe 
cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give the spouse 
unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when 
the State itself lacks that right." Id. at 70. 
The Court applied the same reasoning to the parental consent provision: 
Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, 
so here, the State does not have the constitutional author· 
8
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blanket parental consent provision at issue granted an abso-
lute third party veto, and thus, violated the minor's constitu-
tional right to privacy.49 Nevertheless, the Court explained 
that states need only prove that parental consent statutes 
meet a significant state interest in order to stand. 50 
The Court clarified its view of the constitutional require-
ments for a valid parental consent statute in Bellotti v. 
Baird.51 In Bellotti, the Court reviewed a statute containing a 
judicial bypass procedure as a substitute for parental con-
sent.52 The judicial bypass procedure allowed a minor whose 
parents refused consent to bring a suit in the superior court.53 
If the minor proved to the judge that an abortion was in her 
best interests, the judge had the authority to permit the abor-
1d. at 74. 
ity to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbi-
trary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of 
the reason for withholding the consent. 
49. See id. at 75. The Court explained: "The fault with [the parental consent 
provision] is that it imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by a person 
other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termina-
tion of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the restric-
tion." 1d. 
50. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. Although the Court acknowledged that minors 
share the constitutional rights of adults, it concluded that states have greater 
discretion in regulating minors than adults: "The Court . . . long has recognized 
that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of chil-
dren than of adults. It remains, then, to examine whether there is any significant 
state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent .... " 1d. at 
74-75 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
51. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). William Baird, acting as the director of a parents 
group, a physician who performed abortions, and a pseudonymous pregnant minor 
going by the name "Mary Moe," challenged the statute as unconstitutional. 1d. at 
626. AB quoted by the Court, the statute required, in part: "If the mother is less 
than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother 
and her parents is required." 1d. at 625 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 112, 
§ 12S (West Supp. 1979». 
52. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44. The Court accepted the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts' certification of several questions regarding the application 
of the statute as authoritative. First, the statute required parental notice in every 
case where it was possible. Second, the statute gave the judge the authority to 
refuse to grant permission for the abortion even when the minor had demonstrat-
ed that she had sufficient maturity to make the decision for herself. 1d. at 631-32. 
53. 1d. at 625 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 
1979)) ("If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may 
be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause 
shown .... "). 
9
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In rejecting the parental consent statute at issue in 
Bellotti, the Supreme Court held that the statute's judicial 
bypass procedure failed to adequately protect the rights of the 
minor. 55 The plurality, in what four concurring Justices called 
an "advisory opinion,"56 described the constitutional require-
ments for a judicial bypass procedure that would sufficiently 
protect the privacy interests of the minor. 57 In the system de-
54. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 630 (citing Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N.E. 
2d 288, 293 (Mass. 1977». 
Id. 
55. Id. at 651. The Court held: 
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part, 
[Massachusetts' parental consent law) falls short of them 
in two respects: First, it permits judicial authorization for 
an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by 
the superior court to be mature and fully competent to 
make this decision independently. Second, it requires 
parental consultation or notification in every instance, 
without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to 
receive an independent judicial determination that she is 
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in 
her best interests. 
56. Id. at 656 n.4. In his concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Blackmun joined, Justice Stevens noted that, "[ulntil and unless 
Massachusetts or another State enacts a less restrictive statutory scheme, this 
Court has no occasion to render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of 
such a scheme." Id. 
The same group of Justices argued that the Massachusetts statute permi'tted 
a unilateral third-party veto and thus fell under the holding of Danforth: "[N)o 
minor in Massachusetts, no matter how mature and capable of informed 
decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent of either both her 
parents or a superior court judge. In every instance, the minor's decision to secure 
an abortion is subject to an absolute third-party veto." Id. at 653-54. 
57. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48. The plurality explained: 
[E)very minor must have the opportunity-if she so de-
sires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or 
notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is 
mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the 
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her 
to act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails 
to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this 
decision independently, she must be permitted to show 
that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best inter-
ests. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must 
authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not per-
suaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abor-
tion would be in her best interests, it may decline to 
sanction the operation. 
10
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scribed, if a minor proved to the trial court that she was suffi-
ciently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court 
would be required to grant permission.68 
2. Parental Notification Statutes 
Some states passed statutes. reqUlnng that parents be 
notified before their minor children could obtain an abortion. 59 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional-
ity of several of these parental notification statutes.60 
In the first of the parental notification cases, H.L. v. 
Matheson,61 the Court noted that parental involvement in a 
minor's decision regarding abortion is desirable because par-
ents can "provide medical and psychological data, refer the 
physician to other sources of medical history, such as family 
physicians, and authorize family physicians to give relevant 
data. "62 Thus, the Court upheld the parental notification stat-
ute in that case.63 
[d. (emphasis added). 
58. [d. 
59. Unlike parental consent statutes, parental notification statutes do not reo 
quire that minors obtain the permission of a parent. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-7-305 (1995). So long as the specified number of parents have been notified of 
the minor's plans, she can act on her own decision. See id. 
60. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (re· 
viewing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(b)(1) (1987), which allows a physician to 
perform an abortion on a minor only if he or she provided twenty·four hours no· 
tice to one of the minor's parents. In the alternative, the minor's adult brother, 
sister, stepparent, or grandparent could be notified as a substitute for the parent 
if the minor and the other relative each filed an affidavit stating that the minor 
feared physical, sexual, or severe emotional abuse from one of her parents. See 
Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 507.); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (review· 
ing MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2}-(7) (1988), which provides: "[Nlo abortion shall be 
performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours after both of 
her parents have been notified." Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422.); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398 (1980) (reviewing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (1978), which provides: "To 
enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment he shall ... notify, if 
possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be 
performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is married."). 
61. 450 U.S. 398 (1980). See supra note 60. 
62. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411. 
63. [d. at 413. The Court reasoned: "[Tlhe statute plainly serves important 
state interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not 
violate any guarantees of the Constitution." [d. 
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In Hodgson v. Minnesota,64 however, the Court struck 
down a statute's requirement that both parents of a minor 
seeking an abortion be notified before the procedure can be 
performed.65 The Court explained that the asserted benefits of 
parental notification could be met adequately without requir-
ing notification of both parents.66 
In Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,67 decided on the 
same day as Hodgson, the Court held that any parental notifi-
cation statute which includes a judicial bypass procedure that 
meets the standards set in Danforth and Bellotti is constitu-
tional.68 A majority of the Court in each of the parental notifi-
cation cases adopted the "advisory opinion" from Bellotti, which 
set forth the elements of a constitutionally valid parental con-
sent statute.69 
3. California Legislature's Response to Federal Jurisprudence 
In enacting its own parental consent statute, the Califor-
nia Legislature tailored its efforts to meet the requirements of 
Danforth, Bellotti, and their progeny.70 These efforts led sev-
'64. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). See supra note 60. 
65. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450. The Court stated: "[T)he requirement that both 
parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed 
responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any 
legitimate state interest." Id. The Court emphasized that any legitimate state 
interest served by a two-parent notification requirement would be met adequately 
by notifying only one parent. Id. The Court noted the potential impact of the two-
parent notification requirement in dysfunctional families, where it foresaw the 
possibility of physical and emotional abuse. See id. at 451 n.36. 
66. Id. at 450. 
67. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). See supra note 60 for a description of the relevant 
statute. 
68. Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 511. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of these standards. The Court acknowledged that parental notifica-
tion statutes are not as intrusive as parental consent statutes. Akron Ctr., 497 
U.S. at 511. However, since the judicial bypass permitted by the statute at issue 
met the requirements of Danforth and Bellotti, the Court did not address the issue 
of whether parental notification statutes are exempted from the need for an ade-
quate bypass procedure. See Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 510. 
69. See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 420; Akron Ctr., 
497 U.S. at 511. 
70. The legislature took its stated interests in passing the statute directly 
from the United States Supreme Court cases. Appellants' Opening Brief at 20-21, 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) 
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eral commentators to predict that the statute would meet a 
federal constitutional challenge.71 Although the statute ap-
pears to pass federal constitutional muster, respondents in 
American Academy of Pediatrics II claim that conformity with 
federal standards is not the pertinent issue;72 rather, they 
argue, the California Supreme Court should evaluate the stat-
ute under the right to privacy found in the California Constitu-
tion and related California cases.73 Commentators have, for 
the most part, agreed that the statute would fail to withstand 
such a challenge under the California Constitution.74 
(No. S041459). The California statute avoids the absolute third party veto that 
proved fatal to the statute in Danforth. Malena R. Calvin, Note, The Constitution· 
ality of California's Parental Consent to Abortion Statute, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 591, 604 (1991). Calvin noted: 
Consistent with Danforth, California's statute does not im-
pose an absolute veto power which may be exercised by 
someone other than the pregnant minor and her physi-
cian. The statute provides that if the minor's parents 
refuse to grant their consent, the minor may file a peti-
tion with the juvenile court for a hearing on whether she 
may avoid the parental consent requirement. 
[d. The wording of the California statute, especially the judicial bypass procedure, 
tracks the language of the Bellotti plurality in a clear attempt to follow the "advi-
sory opinion" issued in that case. See supra notes 51-58 arid accompanying text for 
a discussion of Bellotti. 
71. See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 70; Gregory W. Herring, Comment, Eroding 
Roe: the Politics and Constitutionality of California's Parental Consent Abortion 
Statute, 20 PAC. L.J. 1167, 1191 (1989) (each predicting that the California paren-
tal consent statute would pass federal constitutional muster); but see Robert W. 
Lucas, Comment, Aborting the Rights of Minors? Questioning the Constitutionality 
of California's Parental Consent Statute, 19 PAC. L.J. 1487, 1507-10 (1988) (predict-
ing that the California parental consent statute would fail to meet federal consti-
tutional standards). 
72. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 4, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II, (No. A058627). Respondents note that, "the State maintains, once 
again, that the contours of state constitutional privacy rights should be defined by 
current interpretations of federal law. This position ignores both decades of prece-
dent and the autonomy. of the state judiciary to independently interpret the Cali-
fornia Constitution." [d. 
73. See id. at 3. Respondents contend: "The real issue here is whether, under 
the California Constitution, the statute's severe burden on the fundamental repro-
ductive rights of California's young women is justified." [d. 
74. See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 70, at 606; Lucas, supra note 71, at 1513-16; 
Herring, supra note 71, at 1204-05. 
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B. CALIFORNIA'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE 
In 1969, four years prior to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,75 the California Supreme 
Court determined that a woman's right to choose an abortion 
represents a fundamental privacy interest.76 In People v. 
Belous,77 the California Supreme Court rejected a section of 
the California Penal Code that made it illegal for a physician 
to perform an abortion for any reason other than when "neces-
sary to preserve" the life of the mother.7s The California Su-
preme Court held that the law violated a woman's fundamen-
tal right to make reproductive choices.79 
Three years later, the people of California passed the "Pri-
vacy Initiative."so This initiative amended the California Con-
75. 410 u.S. 113 (1973). 
76. See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
915 {1970}. The Belous court noted that both the United States Supreme Court 
and the California Supreme Court had repeatedly recognized that the right to 
privacy concerning marriage, family, and sex constituted a fundamental right. ld. 
It was not until four years later, however, in Roe, that the United States Supreme 
Court applied that same reasoning to the right to obtain an abortion. See supra 
notes 37·39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roe. 
77. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 {1970}. 
78. ld. The Penal Code read: 
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to 
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, 
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or 
other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the 
miscarriage of such woman, except as provided in the 
Therapeutic Abortion Act of the Health and Safety Code, 
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988). 
79. Belous, 458 P.2d at 206. The California Supreme Court reasoned that the 
original purpose of the law, to protect women's lives, was no longer furthered. 
Rather, the incidence of illegal abortions, and the higher rate of death and serious 
infection associated with them, showed that the law in fact harmed the stated 
interests. ld. at 200·02. The supreme court cited a letter from medical profession-
als and deans of the California medical schools: "These recorded facts bring one 
face-to-face with the hard, shocking-almost brutal-reality that our statute de-
signed in 1850 to protect women from serious risks to life and health has in mod-
ern times become a scourge." ld. at 20l. 
80. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. The initiative added an explicit right to privacy to 
the California Constitution. The relevant constitutional section, as later amended, 
reads: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." ld. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/2
1995] PARENTAL CONSENT FOR MINORS' ABORTION 477 
stitution to explicitly include the right to privacy.81 
The ballot pamphlet argument written by the Privacy 
Initiative's proponents indicates the intended scope of the 
explicit right to privacy.82 This pamphlet clarifies that the 
new right to privacy applies to minors: "There should be no 
ambiguity about whether our constitutional freedoms are for 
every man, woman and child in this state."aa 
In one of the earliest California Supreme Court cases to 
interpret this amendment, the supreme court explained that 
the intent of the Privacy Initiative's proponents was to create 
"a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Califor-
nian."84 Thus, minors apparently share in the privacy 
protections guaranteed by the California Constitution.85 
In general, the federal right to privacy "appears to be 
narrower than what the voters approved in 1972 when they 
added 'privacy' to the California Constitution."86 Specifically 
in the area of reproductive rights, the California Supreme 
Court has held the California privacy right to be more exten-
Whether this new explicit right is broader in scope than the implicit federal right 
to privacy presents a pivotal issue in American Academy of Pediatrics II. 
81. Id. The ballot pamphlet argument advanced by proponents of the initiative 
has been cited to explain the reasoning behind the initiative. The ballot pamphlet 
reads, in part: "The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a funda· 
mental and compelling interest." KENNETH CORY & GEORGE R. MOSCONE, PRO· 
POSED AMENDMENTS To CONSTITUTION. PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAws To· 
GETHER WITH ARGUMENTS. GENERAL ELECTION Nov. 7, 1972, at 27 (1972) (empha· 
sis added). 
82. See CORY & MOSCONE, supra note 81, at 26·27. The California Supreme 
Court noted the value of ballot pamphlets as sources of information regarding the 
rationale for public initiatives: "California decisions have long recognized the pro· 
priety of resorting to such election brochure arguments as an aid in construing 
legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to a vote of 
the people." White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 n.11 (Cal. 1975). 
83. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 18, American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627) (quoting 
CORY & MOSCONE, supra note 81, at 27) (emphasis added). 
84. White, 533 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). The supreme court emphasized 
that the pamphlet arguments represented "in essence, the only 'legislative history' 
of the constitutional amendment available to us." Id. 
85. See id. The scope of minors' rights to privacy under the California Consti· 
tution, contrasted with the United States Constitution, poses an important issue in 
American Academy of Pediatrics II. 
86. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 439 n.3 (Cal. 1980). 
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sive than its federal counterpart: "Certainly it is true that our 
State Constitution has been construed to provide California 
citizens with privacy protections encompassing procreative 
decisionmaking-broader, indeed, than those recognized by the 
Federal Constitution."s7 Thus, the California Supreme Court 
has viewed the addition of an explicit right to privacy to the 
California Constitution as an expansion of the federal right.88 
The expanded scope of California's right to privacy was put 
to the test in the court of appeal in American Academy of Pedi-
atrics II. Respondents reminded the court of California's inde-
pendent jurisprudence in the area of privacy rights.s9 The 
court of appeal accepted respondents' argument and applied a 
"compelling interest" test.90 
IV. THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL'S ANALYSIS: 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS v. LUNGREN 
In affirming the permanent injunction against the statute, 
the court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II con-
sidered and rejected several of appellants' theories.91 Specifi-
cally, the court considered whether the case must be remanded 
to be tested against the requirements of a new California Su-
preme Court decision.92 The court also reviewed appellants' 
assertion that compelling state interests justify any infringe-
ment by the parental consent statute upon the right to priva-
87. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
206 (1993). 
88. See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 
1981). 
89. See Respondents' Brief at 12-14, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
A058627). 
90. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 555 
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court of 
appeal held that the compelling interest standard was applicable, instead of the 
federal "significant interest" standard which had been required in Danforth and its 
progeny. See id. See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Danforth and its progeny. 
91. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. 
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
92. See id. at 551. The court of appeal noted that the California Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994), requires all 
California right to privacy cases to be analyzed under its reasoning. See id. 
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cy.93 Finally, the court considered appellants' contention that 
parents' right to be involved in decisions concerning their chil-
dren supersedes minors' privacy interests.94 Based upon its 
analysis of these issues, the court of appeal held that the stat-
ute impermissibly violates minors' right to privacy under the 
California Constitution.95 Accordingly, the court of appeal af-
firmed the permanent injunction against enforcement of the 
parental consent statute. 96 
A. THE EFFECT OF HILL V. NCAA 
In January 1994, the California Supreme Court rejected 
the traditional rule that a "compelling interest" analysis be 
applied to all right to privacy cases.97 In place of the tradi-
tional rule, the court devised a new three-part test.98 Thus, in 
order to determine whether there has been a violation of the 
right to privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution, 
California courts must now evaluate three factors: first, a le-
93. See id. at 558-59. 
94. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558-59. 
95. [d. at 555-56. 
96. [d. at 559. 
97. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 654-56 (Cal. 1994). The California Supreme 
Court, analyzing several of its previous decisions which applied the compelling 
interest standard, held: 
[d. at 653. 
The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy 
interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the 
invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the 
critical factor in the analysis. Where the case involves an 
obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal 
autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or 
the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a 
"compelling interest" must be present to overcome the 
vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest 
is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing 
tests are employed. 
98. See id. at 654-56. The California Supreme Court summarized the new rule: 
[d. at 656. 
Based on our review of the Privacy Initiative, we hold 
that a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation 
of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish 
each of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy inter-
est; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circum-
stances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a seri-
ous invasion of privacy. 
17
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gaIly protected privacy interest must be involved; second, the 
complaining party must have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy; and third, the alleged violation must constitute a serious 
invasion of the privacy interest.99 If a court analyzing these 
elements determines that a prima facie case for invasion of 
privacy has been established, the court must then consider any 
defenses asserted. 100 
The court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II 
interpreted this new "Hill" test as a balancing test, in which a 
strong showing in one element could make up for a weaker 
showing in another. 101 
99. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 554 
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (citing Hill, 
865 P.2d at 654-56). Hill involved a challenge to the NCAA mandatory drug-test-
ing rules for student athletes. Applying the three parts of its newly announced 
test, the supreme court reasoned that student athletes have legally protected pri-
vacy interests in not being observed directly during urination. Nevertheless, the 
supreme court held that the drug-testing program did not violate students' reason-
able expectation of privacy, because student athletes commonly come to expect to 
be observed unclothed by team personnel and to be subjected to various physical 
and medical examinations. By voluntarily joining a team which was a member of 
the NCAA, the supreme court noted, a student athlete implicitly agreed to a lesser 
expectation of privacy. Finally, the supreme court reasoned that, despite the less-
ened expectation of privacy, direct monitoring of urination constituted a serious 
invasion of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 657-59. 
100. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655-56. In describing the new method for evaluating 
right to privacy cases, the California Supreme Court noted: 
[d. 
The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the 
privacy right necessarily requires that privacy interests be 
specifically identified and carefully compared with compet-
ing or countervailing privacy and non privacy interests in 
a 'balancing test . . . .' Invasion of a privacy interest is 
not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy 
if the invasion is justified by a competing interest. 
101. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. The court of 
appeal noted: 
[d. 
For example, where it is shown that the privacy interest 
at issue is very strong, a plaintiff will be able to make 
out a prima facie case even though his or her expectation 
of privacy is not extremely strong, or the invasion of the 
privacy interest is not extremely serious. 
In its application of Hill's three-part test to the facts of American Academy 
of Pediatrics II, the court of appeal held that the importance of the privacy inter-
est at issue bolstered the other two elements: 
The plaintiffs in this case clearly made a prima facie 
showing of an unconstitutional invasion of the right to 
18
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Discussing each of the three Hill elements as they applied 
to American Academy of Pediatrics II,I02 the court of appeal 
emphasized that the right to choose whether to obtain an abor-
tion is "an exceedingly fundamental privacy interest."103 Al-
though a minor was acknowledged to have a reduced general 
expectation of privacy, the court stated that her privacy expec-
tations regarding procreative choices are strong and valid. 104 
Finally, the court of appeal found that the statute seriously 
infringes upon two separate privacy interests: the right to 
choose privately to obtain an abortion and the right actually to 
obtain an abortion. 105 Because "this legislation creates the 
possibility that a minor will be compelled to bear. a child 
against her wishes,,,I06 the court of appeal felt that "[i]t would 
be hard to imagine a more egregious breach of social 
norms.,,107 
Upon balancing the Hill elements, the court held that 
plaintiff-respondents had established a prima facie case that 
the parental consent statute violates minors' constitutionally 
protected privacy interests. 108 
privacy. Moreover, although all three elements of the 
cause of action have been established, the strength of the 
interest at issue is such that the plaintiffs need only have 
shown that the minors have some expectation of privacy 
albeit not as great an expectation as an adult might 
have, and that the invasion of that interest is real-as 
opposed to overwhelming. 
Id. at 555-56. 
102. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554-56. See id. 
at 554 (discussing the "legally protected privacy interest" requirement). See id. at 
555 (discussing the "reasonable expectation of privacy" requirement). See id. at 
555-56 (discussing the "seriousness of invasion of privacy interest" requirement). 
103. Id. at 554. The court of appeal reasoned: "There can be no question but 
that the right to choose whether or not to give birth, including the right to choose 
an abortion, is not only an interest involving autonomy privacy, but an exceedingly 
fundamental privacy interest." Id. 
104. Id. at 555. The court of appeal noted: "Many adolescents, even those in 
the most functional of homes, do not discuss their procreative choices with their 
parents, and they certainly have no expectation of discussing them with a judge." 
Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. 
108. Id. See supra note 101 for discussion that the strength of the privacy issue 
allowed for a lesser showing in the other two elements of the Hill test. 
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B. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
After determining that respondents had established a 
prima facie case for invasion of privacy, the court of appeal 
next considered whether the state had a sufficient justification 
for the statute's infringement upon minors' right to priva-
cy.I09 Under Hill, the burden of proof falls on the defendant, 
here, appellants, to show that the invasion of the right to pri-
vacy is justified. lIO Hill requires that a compelling· counter-
vailing interest must be substantially furthered where the 
privacy interest at issue is "fundamental to personal autono-
my."ll1 
Because appellants failed to prove that any interests, com-
pelling or otherwise, would be furthered by the parental con-
sent statute, the court of appeal held that the statute's in-
fringement of minors' right to privacy is unconstitutional.1I2 
Moreover, the court of appeal echoed the trial court's determi-
nation that the current health care system provides a less 
burdensome alternative to the parental consent statute.113 
Although Hill was decided after the trial court in Ameri-
109. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 556 
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
110. Hill, 865 P.2d at 657. The California Supreme Court explained in Hill that 
a defendant can prevail in a right to privacy case by proving, as an affirmative 
defense, "that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers 
one or more countervailing interests. Plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant's 
assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible and effective 
alternatives to defendant's conduct which have a lesser impact on privacy inter-
ests." [d. 
111. [d. at 653. The Hill opinion is somewhat unclear as to whether the funda-
mental nature of the privacy interest should be evaluated prior to application of 
the new three-part test (thus supplanting the three-part test in some cases), or is 
simply part of the analysis of defenses following establishment of plaintiffs prima 
facie case. The court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II applied the 
compelling interest test to the State's defense of justification. See American Acade-
my of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556. 
112. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556. 
113. [d. The court of appeal noted that the current system, in which neither 
parental consent nor a judicial bypass procedure is required for a minor to obtain 
an abortion, protects minors' interests without infringing upon protected privacy 
rights: "It also appears that the existing medical system in fact serves these as-
serted interests and that the legislation therefore is not the least intrusive means 
available of furthering them." [d. at 550. 
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can Academy of Pediatrics II had announced its opinion, the 
court of appeal held that there was no need to remand the case 
to apply the new Hill test.U4 The court believed that the trial 
court had, in its compelling interest analysis, substantially 
addressed each element of Hill's balancing test. ll5 
The court of appeal also rejected appellants' argument that 
the trial court had erred in considering evidence that the pa-
rental consent statute would harm state interests rather than 
further them. us Appellants had argued that, in a facial at-
tack, the legislature's rational belief that a statute would 
achieve its desired results makes moot any evidence to the con-
trary.ll7 The court of appeal disagreed, however, explaining 
that acceptance of the legislative facts at face value would be 
inappropriate in this case because a fundamental right was 
implicated U8 
C. THE MINOR'S PRIVACY INTEREST VERSUS THE PARENTS' 
INTEREST 
Lastly, the court of appeal rejected appellants' argument 
that parents' interests in being involved in their children's 
medical decisions supersede minors' privacy interests. u9 
114. Id. at 554. 
115. Id. The court of appeal stated: "[T)he reasoning and conclusions of the 
superior court remain valid under the [Hill) test, and that the judgment, accord-
ingly, should be affirmed without remand." Id. 
116. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57. 
117. Id. at 557. The court of appeal summarized appellants' argument: "The 
State's position is that where, as here, there is a facial challenge to a law, the 
only question is whether the Legislature rationally could believe that the law will 
further a compelling state interest." Id. 
118. Id. The court of appeal explained: 
When legislation invades a fundamental right, the courts 
have the duty to look behind and legislative finding and 
independently determine whether a particular invasion is 
justified . . .. [Thus, u)nder the circumstances of the 
present case, it was entirely appropriate for the superior 
court to consider such evidence as was presented to deter-
mine if [California's parental consent statute) in fact fur-
thered a compelling interest, and if that interest might be 
furthered by less restrictive means. 
Id. at 557-58. 
119. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (Ct. 
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
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While recognizing parents' strong interest in being involved in 
important decisions regarding their children, the court of ap-
peal held that minors' constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests must take precedence.12o Specifically in the area of pro-
creative decisions, the court noted that, "even under the more 
limited right of privacy guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion, a child's right of privacy exceeds the parent's right to be 
involved in the abortion decision."121 According to the court of 
appeal, California, with its more stringent privacy standard, 
should protect the minor's privacy interest even more vigorous-
ly.122 
D. CONCLUSION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL 
Because appellants failed to prove at trial that the statute 
would further any of its stated interests, the court of appeal 
affirmed that California's parental consent statute is an unnec-
essary and impermissible violation of minors' protected right to 
privacy under the California Constitution.123 On appeal to the 
California Supreme Court, the parties renew their respective 
arguments.124 
120. Id. at 559. The court of appeal cited a California Supreme Court case to 
support its finding: "In some situations, however, there may be a conflict of inter· 
ests (between parent and child). In these situations, the legal system should pro· 
tect the child's interests." Id. (citing In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 
1981)). 
,121. Id. The court of appeal cited the federal parental consent cases to demon-
strate that even under the United States Constitution's reduced privacy protection, 
parents may not be afforded an absolute veto over the minor's decision to obtain, 
an abortion. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979». See supra 
notes 45-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal parental involvement 
cases. See generally Jennifer Wohlstadter, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Cen-
ter, Inc.: The Constitutionality of Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones, 25 GoLDEN GATE U. 
L. REv. 543 (1995) (discussing the standard of review applying to abortion clinic 
buffer zones). 
122. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. The court of 
appeal stated: "We have concluded that the right of privacy guaranteed by the 
California Constitution permits less intrusion than does the federally guaranteed 
right. There is, accordingly, even greater reason to conclude that any parental 
interests in the child's decisions or welfare must bow to the child's right of priva-
cy." Id. 
123. Anlerican Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 559 (Ct. 
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept, 29, 1994). 
124. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 7-45, Anlerican Academy of Pediatrics v. 
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V. APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS 
Appellants argue that the court of appeal mistakenly con-
sidered evidence that the parental consent statute would be 
harmful rather than beneficial.125 Appellants further contend 
that minors' privacy interests are less protected than those of 
adults. 126 Thus, citing a long line of federal cases, appellants 
argue that the proper judicial standard for evaluating parental 
consent cases is the significant interest standard, rather than 
the compelling interest standard. 127 Even if the compelling 
interest standard is appropriate, appellants maintain 
California's parental consent statute meets that standard. 128 
Appellants further contend that the court of appeal misapplied 
the elements of the new Hill 129 test. 130 According to appel-
lants, the court of appeal improperly ignored parents' interests 
in maintaining the parent-child relationship and in being in-
volved in important decisions regarding their child's upbring-
ing.131 Finally, appellants argue that the parental consent 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1994) (No. S041459). See Respondents' Answer to 
Petition for Review at 15-28, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). See infra note 180 for explanation of 
use of Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review as the latest available articula-
tion of respondents' arguments. 
125. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-22, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review granted, 882 
P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See infra notes 134-39 and accompa-
nying text. 
126. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-35, American Academy of Pediatrics II 
(No. S041459). See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text. 
127. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459) (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
74 (1976)). Appellants argue that both federal and California cases have recognized 
the significant interest test as the proper measure of whether minors' privacy 
rights have been violated. See id. See intro notes 141-46 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of this argument. 
128. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 
(No. S041459). See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
this argument. 
129. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). 
130. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-38, American Academy of Pediatrics II 
(No. S041459). See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
appellants' contention. 
131. See Appellants' Petition for Review at 12, American Academy of Pediatrics 
II (No. A058627). Appellants argue: 
There is no balancing with the child's need for parental 
guidance and support. There is no mention of, let alone 
balancing with, the societal norms underlying parent-child 
23
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statute does not violate minors' rights to informational privacy 
or equal protection. 132 
A. STATE NEED ONLY SHOW A RATIONAL BASIS FOR 
LEGISLATIVE FACTS 
According to appellants, in a facial challenge of a stat-
ute,133 the State merely needs to show that the legislature 
could rationally have believed the statute would further its 
stated interests. 134 Thus, appellants repudiate the relevance 
of evidence presented at trial that the parental consent statute 
would instead injure its stated interests. 135 Instead, appel-
lants contend that the California Supreme Court should "ac-
cord significant weight and deference"136 to the legislature's 
findings because they were taken from language found in Unit-
ed States Supreme Court cases.137 Indeed, appellants argue 
[d. 
relationships and the responsibilities of parents . . .. The 
decision below does not recognize any constitutionally 
permissible mandatory role for parents in unemancipated 
minors' abortion decision making. 
132. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 38-45, American Academy of Pediatrics II 
(No. 8041459). See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
appellants' informational privacy argument. See infra notes 174-79 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of appellants' equal protection argument. 
133. Because the statute has been enjoined since it was initially passed, there 
is no data available concerning its real-world impact. Consequently, any challenge 
must be a "facial" attack; a challenge based on the statute's inherent unconstitu-
tionality rather than upon any impermissible impact. 
Appellants argue: "The statutory provisions under review have never been 
implemented and the determinations of their validity by the lower courts have 
consequently been limited to analysis of their facial validity." Appellants' Petition 
for Review at 8, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 
(Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). 
134. Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
8041459). Appellants argue, "[T]he validity of a statute does not depend on the 
actual existence of legislative facts but on whether the Legislature could rationally 
believe such facts to be established." [d. (citing People v. Mistriel, 241 P.2d 1050, 
1051 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952». 
135. [d. at 21. Appellants argue: "It is irrelevant to that process that these 
facts may be disputed or opposed." [d. (citing People v. Oatis, 70 Cal. Rptr. 524, 
528 (Ct. App. 1968». 
136. [d. at 22. 
137. Appellants' Opening Brief at 20, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
8041459). Appellants describe the legislative findings and their origins: 
In enacting AB 2274 the Legislature made five specific 
findings. These were (a) the medical, emotional, and psy-
24
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that these findings should be considered presumptively consti-
tutional due to their source. 13B Appellants maintain: "Under 
such circumstances it cannot be assumed that the Legislature 
acted irrationally in relying upon determinations of the 
nation's highest court."139 
B. "SIGNIFICANT STATE INTEREST" IS THE APPLICABLE 
STANDARD 
Appellants argue that a long line of federal cases, begin-
ning with Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. 
Danforth,140 establishes that the significant state interest test 
applies to alleged violations of minors' constitutional 
rightS.141 The federal cases hold that minors' privacy interests 
are not coextensive with those of adults.142 Due to minors' 
chological consequences of an abortion are serious and can 
be lasting, particularly when the patient is an immature 
minor; (b) the capacity to become pregnant and the capac-
ity for exercising mature judgment concerning the wisdom 
of an abortion are not logically related; (c) minors often 
lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take 
account of both immediate and long-range consequences of 
their action; (d) parents ordinarily possess information 
essential to a physician's exercise of his or her best medi-
cal judgment concerning a minor child; and (e) parents 
who are aware that their minor daughter has had an 
abortion may better ensure that she receives adequate 
medical attention subsequent to her abortion . . . . Find-
ings (a) and (b) come directly from ... H.L. v. Matheson, 
supra, 450 U.S. 398 at 408, finding (c) comes from 
Bellotti v. Baird, supra, 443 U.S. at 640, and finding (d) 
comes from H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 411. 
[d. at 20-21. 
138. [d. at 21-22. Appellants argue: "Moreover, although the ultimate constitu-
tional interpretation rests with this court, a presumption of constitutional sufficien-
cy is particularly appropriate in circumstances where the Legislature has enacted 
a statute with the relevant constitutional limitations clearly in mind." [d. 
139. [d. at 21. 
140. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
141. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants invoke the United 
States Supreme Court opinions in Danforth and its progeny: "Danforth was the 
first of the eight parental involvement cases and established that the appropriate 
standard against which to measure parental involvement in an unemancipated 
minor's abortion decision making is the significant state interest." [d. (citing 
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74). See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Danforth and its progeny. 
142. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). In Bellotti, the United 
.. 
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"special vulnerabilities,"143 states may exercise more discre-
tion in regulating minors' behavior than would be acceptable if 
applied to adults.144 This discretion, according to appellants: 
is justified by the minor's need for parental 
concern, sympathy and attention, by the recogni-
tion that during the formative years of childhood 
and adolescence minors often lack the experi-
ence, perspective and judgment to recognize and 
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, 
and by the important recognition that parents 
nurture and direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren and have the right and high obligation to 
prepare their children for additional obligations 
and this duty includes the inculcation of moral 
standards, religious beliefs and elements of good 
citizenship. 145 
Thus, because the federal jurisprudence suggests the applica-
tion of a significant interest standard, appellants contend that 
the court of appeal erred in applying the compelling interest 
standard in American Academy of Pediatrics II. 146 
C. THE STATUTE FURTHERS THE STATE'S INTERESTS 
Appellants maintain that, even if a compelling state inter-
est must be met, California's parental consent statute satisfies 
that requirement. 147 Appellants point out that both the trial 
States Supreme Court noted: "We have recognized three reasons justifying the 
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those 
of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role 
in child rearing." [d. 
143. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). 
144. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. The Court noted: "(A)lthough children generally 
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental depriva-
tions as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for 
children's vulnerability .... " [d. 
145. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-10, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635, 642-43). 
146. [d. at 7. 
147. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants assert: 
"Assuming arguendo a compelling state interest is required under Hill, [the paren-
tal consent statute) satisfies such a standard." [d. 
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court and the court of appeal acknowledged the state has two 
valid compelling interests: the interest in protecting minors 
and the interest in maintaining the parent-child relation-
Ship.l48 Again citing language from federal cases, appellants 
argue that these compelling interests are furthered by the 
parental consent statute.149 Appellants assert that, by provid-
ing parents the opportunity to participate in their daughter's 
abortion decision, the statute furthers both stated inter-
ests.160 Relying once more on pronouncements by the United 
States Supreme Court, appellants maintain that the state can 
safely depend "on the presumption the parents will act in the 
best interests of the minor."161 
148. [d. at 10-11. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court: 
[W)e agree with the superior court that the health and 
welfare of minors is indeed a compelling state interest. 
We also agree that the related interest of fostering par-
ent-child relationships may be compelling, and that the 
State may have a legitimate interest in involving parents 
in the decisions of their children . . . . 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (Ct. App. 
1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). 
149. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). Appellants argue that for "some minors the abortion decision raises 
profound moral and religious concerns and parental consultation can assist the 
minor." [d. (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640). Furthermore, "some minors will be 
lonely and even terrified. Parents can provide compassionate and mature advice." 
[d. (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990». Final-
ly, appellants argue that parents can provide doctor with psychological and health 
data. [d. (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 419 (1980». 
150. [d. at 11. 
151. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459) (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 495(1990». In the context of 
his separate opinion in Hodgson, Justice Kennedy discussed the presumption that 
parents act in the best interests of their children: 
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption 
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, expe-
rience, and capacity for judgment required for making 
life's difficult decisions. More importantly, historically, it 
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead par-
ents to act in the best interests of their children . . . . As 
with so many other legal presumptions, experience and 
reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting 
point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases at-
test to this. That some parents "may at times be acting 
against the best interests of their children" ... creates a 
basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard whole-
sale those pages of human experience that teach that 
parents generally do act in the child's best interests. 
[citation omitted] The only cases in which a majority of 
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Furthermore, appellants assert, the parental consent stat-
ute is the least intrusive method of furthering these compelling 
interests.152 Appellants point out that the statute allows for a 
judicial bypass, as well as for the consent of only one par-
ent.15S Apparently due to its compliance with these two feder-
al requirements, appellants argue that the statute represents 
the least intrusive means available. 1M 
D. AUTONOMY PRIVACY: APPELLANTS' HILL ANALYSIS 
Appellants further argue that the court of appeal incor-
rectly applied the three-step analysis required by Hill.155 In 
analyzing the first Hill element, the existence of a legally pro-
tected privacy interest, appellants acknowledge that minors 
enjoy a right to privacy regarding reproductive choices under 
both the Federal and the California Constitutions.156 Appel-
lants contend, however, that these rights are limited in 
scope.157 Citing the United States Supreme Court cases which 
have addressed parental consent and parental notification 
statutes, appellants note that, "[i]n each of these cases the 
the Court has deviated from this principle are those in 
which a State sought to condition a minor's access to 
abortion services upon receipt of her parent's consent to do 
so. 
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 495 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Thus, Justice Kennedy explicitly excluded 
parental consent statutes from the general presumption that parents act in the 
best interests of their children. See id. 
152. Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). 
153. Id. at 15·16. The allowance for a judicial bypass brings the statute within 
the requirements of Bellotti's advisory opinion. See supra notes 51-58 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Bellotti. The permissibility of a statute that re-
quires only one parent to give consent is derived from Hodgson. See supra notes 
64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hodgson. 
154. Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). 
155. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 17-38, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See supra notes 97-115 
and accompanying text for discussion of the Hill test. 
156. Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-23, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). 
157. Id. Appellants note: "The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
an unemancipated minor enjoys a protectable autonomy privacy interest in her 
decision making on whether to undergo an abortion to the extent of not permitting 
an absolute veto over such decision by a parent." [d. 
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Supreme Court approved parental involvement. The Supreme 
Court's identification of the social norms involved and the 
protectable interests arising therefrom should be dispositive 
herein. "158 
After reviewing the federal jurisprudence, 159 appellants 
argue that the California Supreme Court should follow the 
lead of its federal counterpart: "The analysis and precedent of 
the United States Supreme Court cases provide not only the 
policy fountainhead for AB 2274, they provide brilliant illumi-
nation to this court's task of judicial interpretation. "160 Final-
ly, appellants contend that the legislature, rather than the 
Judiciary, is the appropriate body "to weigh social science 
studies and opinions. "161 
Next, appellants address the second Hill element: whether 
the parental consent statute violates a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.162 Appellants argue that, in our society, minors 
have less reasonable expectations of privacy than do 
adults. 163 Without specifically discussing the existence of 
158. [d. at 23. 
159. See id. at 23·32 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1980); Planned 
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976». Appellants review the United States 
Supreme Court's analysis of the issues throughout each of these parental involve-
ment cases. [d. See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the United States Supreme Court's parental consent and parental notification juris-
prudence. 
160. Appellants' Opening Brief at 33, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). 
161. [d. Appellants apparently refer to the evidence introduced at trial and 
summarized by the court of appeal in the appendix following the court's opinion. 
See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-62 app. 
162. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 35-37, American Academy of Pediatrics II 
(No. S041459). 
163. [d. at 36. Appellants contend: "There is a diminished expectation of privacy 
in minors consenting to medical care to the extent of their parents knowledge of 
or indeed, in most instances, making of the decision." [d. 
While citing cases dealing with minors' privacy rights concerning general 
medical care, appellants assert that minors' privacy rights in choosing whether to 
have an abortion are similarly curtailed: "[I)t cannot be concluded that minors 
have the same expectation of privacy in abortion decision making as adults. It is 
not. It is diminished in this arena of decision making as it is generally." [d. 
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minors' reasonable expectation of privacy in abortion decisions, 
appellants once again invoke the United States Supreme 
Court's analysis of parents' responsibility for the "nurture, 
support and guidance" of minors.l64 Appellants apparently 
see the combination of this parental responsibility with minors' 
limited privacy right as justifying the conclusion that minors 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their decision 
whether to obtain an abortion. 165 
Hill's third element requires that the invasion of the right 
to privacy must be a serious one. l66 Rather than dispute the 
seriousness of the parental consent statute's infringement upon 
privacy rights directly, appellants incorporate the arguments 
from the prior two elements: "[t]he analysis of this final ele-
ment of a cognizable privacy claim, in the context presented 
here, is closely interwoven with the identification of a 
protectable privacy interest and the recognition of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and the foregoing analysis of these is-
sues is incorporated here. "167 Appellants' only addition to this 
discussion is that the state can rationally assume that parents 
will in fact "facilitate" their minor's abortion decision. l66 Oth-
erwise, appellants do not contend that the parental consent 
statute's invasion of minors' privacy interests is not serious. 
Rather, the thrust of appellants' argument seems to be that, 
despite the seriousness of any privacy invasion, countervailing 
parental and state interests justify the statute. 169 
164. Appellants' Opening Brief at 35, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). Appellants note: "The United States Supreme Court has ... identified 
in its analysis of this identical issue our societal norms that the primary responsi-
bility for the nurture, support and guidance of children lies in the parents." Id. 
(citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44). 
165. See id. at 35-37. 
166. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. 
167. Appellants' Opening Brief at 37, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
8041459). 
168. Id. 
169. See id. at 37-38. Appellants argue that balancing the parents' and state's 
interests with the minors' privacy interest leads to the conclusion that the inva-
sion of privacy interests does not constitute "an egregious breach of the social 
norms .... " Id. 
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E. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY OR EQUAL PROTECTION 
PRINCIPLES 
Although the court of appeal explicitly declined to decide 
the issues of the statute's violation of rights to informational 
privacy and equal protection,170 appellants argue that the 
California Supreme Court should address these issues. 171 Ap-
pellants contend that the parental consent statute does not vio-
late minors' informational right to privacy because the only 
information collected is limited to court documents involved in 
the judicial bypass procedure.172 Furthermore, appellants ar-
gue, because the purpose of the judicial bypass is to afford 
"minimum due process protection," any incidental invasion of 
the informational privacy interest is justified.173 
Appellants also request that the California Supreme Court 
reverse the trial court's determination that the parental con-
sent statute violates the California Constitution's equal protec-
tion guarantee.174 The trial court reasoned that the statute 
170. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 559 (Ct. 
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court noted: 
[d. 
Plaintiffs contended that by creating and maintaining re-
cords relating to the bypass procedures, A.B. 2274 violates 
the right to informational privacy. The superior court did 
not analyze this argument, concluding that, because the 
State had been unable to justify the burden on privacy 
rights in general, it also could not justify the burden 
placed on informational privacy. Having concluded that 
this legislation unconstitutionally interferes with autonomy 
privacy, we need not also consider whether it places an 
impermissible burden on informational privacy. Nor shall 
we consider the constitutional question of whether A.B. 
2274 also violates equal protection guarantees. 
171. Appellants' Opening Brief at 38, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants point out: 
"It is important that they be decided since each formed an additional independent 
basis for the trial court's decision to enjoin AB 2274." [d. 
172. [d. at 39. Appellants argue: "The forms adopted by the Judicial Council 
seek no more information than is necessary for a court to properly perform its 
duties under the statute." [d. 
173. [d. at 39-40. Appellants note: "There can be no serious dispute that due 
process requirements are a compelling state interest." Appellants' Opening Brief at 
40, Americ(ln Academy of Pediatrics II (No. S041459). 
174. [d. at 38. The equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution 
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regulates pregnant minors who choose to obtain an abortion, 
while not regulating pregnant minors who choose to bring their 
pregnancy to term.175 Appellants argue that this distinction is 
permissible because the two groups are not similarly situat-
ed.176 Appellants cite two specific differences between' these 
groups: first, appellants argue that there is a public health 
interest in minors receiving prenatal care, while there is no 
such interest in minors obtaining an abortion.177 Second, ap-
pellants maintain that an abortion decision involves moral and 
ethical choices which are not involved in the decision to contin-
ue a pregnancy to term. 178 Because those choosing to end 
pregnancy by abortion and those choosing to continue the preg-
nancy to term are differently situated, appellants argue, the 
parental consent statute's regulation of only one of these 
groups does not violate equal protection.179 
reads: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law or denied equal protection of the laws . ... " CAL. CONST. art. I § 7(a) 
(emphasis added). 
175. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. at 31-34 
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 5, 1992). Again, the court of appeal declined to rule on the 
equal protection issue. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. 
176. Appellants' Opening Brief at 41, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No. 
S041459). 
177. [d. Appellants argue: 
[d. at 42. 
It is critical to the health of the fetus and the unemanci-
pated minor that prenatal care begin as early in the 
pregnancy as possible. It is this risk to the as yet un-
born, but developing, fetus that justifies providing this 
care without parental consent. The health risks to the 
pregnant unemancipated minor are personal health risks. 
The health risks to the developing fetus, being taken to 
term, are public health concerns. 
178. [d. at 41. Appellants once again return to the United States Supreme 
Court's opinions, this time citing Roe v. Wade: "One's philosophy, one's experience, 
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's 
attitude toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one 
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and color one's think-
ing and conclusions about abortion." [d. at 44 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 116). 
179. Appellants' Opening Brief at 45, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No. 
S041459). Appellants argue: "The differences between these two classes of uneman-
cipated minors are significant and fundamental and it is submitted demonstrate 
they are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis." [d. 
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VI. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS 
According to respondents,180 the unanimous decisions of 
the trial and appellate courts that the statute is unconstitu-
tional should be affirmed by the California Supreme Court. 181 
Respondents argue that appellants mischaracterize the crucial 
issues, fail to confront the lower courts' factual findings, and 
substitute dicta from opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court for thorough analysis of the constitutional issues pre-
sented.182 The real issue under consideration, according to re-
spondents, is not "whether the California Constitution 'prohib-
it[s] parental involvement' in a teenager's reproductive deci-
sion."183 Rather, respondents contend, the California Supreme 
Court must decide whether the parental consent statute's bur-
den on minors' right to privacy under the California Constitu-
tion is justified. l84 Respondents argue that each element of 
180. At the time of this writing, Respondents' Reply Brief to the Appellant's 
Opening Brief had not yet been filed at the California Supreme Court. Thus, the 
most recent available articulations of respondents' arguments were Respondents' 
Answer to Petition for Review and Respondents' Brief from the earlier proceeding 
at the court of appeal. 
18l. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 29, American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review 
granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Respondents argue: 
"The Superior Court and Court of Appeal have thoroughly and correctly resolved 
the issues presented by this case. The statute invades the fundamental reproduc-
tive rights of California's young women without justification, and, therefore, vio-
lates the California Constitution." [d. at 4-5. 
182. [d. at 2. Respondents contend that, "the State offers no basis for doubting 
the unanimous conclusions of the trial and appellate courts that this restrictive 
law violates the California Constitution. Instead, the State distorts the issues 
central to this case, disregards extensive empirical findings and denigrates the 
independence of our state Constitution." [d. 
183. [d. (quoting Appellants' Petition for Review at 2, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627». Appellants repeatedly asserted that the court of 
appeal's decision, if left to stand, would "prohibit," parental involvement. See 
Appellants' Petition for Review at 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, American Academy of Pediatrics 
II (No. A058627). Respondents reply that there is a difference between prohibiting 
involvement and striking down a statute that mandates such involvement: "Re-
spondents have never challenged the right of parents to provide guidance to their 
children, and no court has ever ruled that the constitutional right to privacy 
'prohibits' parental involvement in a daughter's reproductive decision. Such a deci-
sion would indeed be an extraordinary intrusion into family privacy." Respondents' 
Answer to Petition for Review at 23, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
A058627). 
184. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 3, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
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the test set forth in Hill v. NCAA 185 was properly analyzed by 
the court of appeal.188 Moreover, respondents urge the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to independently evaluate the validity of 
the statute under California law, rather than bow to proclama-
tions from the United States Supreme Court. 187 Because the 
current system does a better job than the parental consent 
statute of furthering the state's interests, respondents contend, 
the parental consent statute is not justified. ISS Finally, re-
spondents renew their arguments that the parental consent 
statute violates constitutional rights to informational privacy 
and equal protection. 189 
A. RESPONDENTS' HILL ANALYSIS 
Respondents argue that the court of appeal properly ap-
plied the Hill test. 190 Respondents point to California Su-
preme Court holdings to support the argument that, "the inti-
mate and life-altering decision of whether to become a parent 
is at the core of fundamental autonomy interests protected by 
the California constitutional right to privacy."191 According to 
respondents, these cases conclusively establish minors' legally 
protected privacy interest in making reproductive choices.192 
185. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). 
186. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17-21, American Acade-
my of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627). 
187. See id. at 24-27. 
188. See id. at 21-23. 
189. See id. at 27-28. 
190. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 16-21, American Academy 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). 
191. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17, American Academy of 
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (citing Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 
(Cal. 1985) (sterilization as form of contraception); Committee to Defend Reprod. 
Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) (abortion); People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 
194 (Cal. 1969) (abortion), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970». 
Respondents point out that these same three cases were cited in Hill as 
concerning prime examples of fundamental autonomy privacy rights. ld. at 17-18 
(citing Hill, .865 P.2d at 653 n.ll (majority opinion), 670 (Kennard, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in the judgment». 
192. ld. Respondents discuss the broad nature of California's privacy right, 
arguing that it protects minors as well as adults. Moreover, respondents address 
appellants' argument that minors have a less extensive right to privacy than 
adults: 
In some instances, of course, the State has an interest in 
regulating conduct which is compelling as applied to chil-
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Respondents next argue that minors have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their reproductive decision-mak-
ing.193 Respondents distinguish pregnant minors from plain-
tiffs in recent California Supreme Court cases, where the court 
held that those plaintiffs' voluntary actions, such as joining an 
athletic team or filing a law suit, invalidate their expectations 
of privacy.194 Pregnant minors, according to respondents, per-
form no such voluntary action which should strip them of their 
otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy in reproductive 
decision-making. 195 
Finally, respondents contend that the parental consent 
statute's invasion of the right to privacy is indeed serious. l96 
By putting substantial obstacles in the way of a minor seeking 
an abortion, respondents argue, the statute seriously invades a 
protected privacy right. 197 Furthermore, echoing the court of 
appeal's opinion, respondents note that the statute "creates the 
possibility that a minor will be compelled to bear a child 
against her wishes. It would be hard to imagine a more egre-
gious breach of social norms. ,,198 
Accordingly, respondents point out, the court of appeal 
properly ruled on all three elements of the Hill test. l99 By 
satisfying these elements, respondents argue, they have estab-
lished a prima facie violation of the right to privacy.200 
dren, but not adults. However, the State's greater authori-
ty results from the application of the constitutional stan-
dard in a particular context, not the standard itself, 
which does not vary with the age or cognitive capacity of 
the individual. 
1d. at 18 (citing Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760). 
193. 1d. at 19. 
194. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 19, American Academy of 
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (citing Hill, 865 P.2d 633; Heller v. Norcal Mut. Ins. 
Co., 876 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1994». 
195. 1d. 
196. 1d. at 20. According to respondents, "[t]his penal statute clearly imposes a 
severe burden on a fundamental right which must satisfy the highest standard of 
constitutional justification." 1d. 
197. 1d. 
198. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 20, American Academy of 
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 555). 
199. 1d. at 21. 
200. See id. at 16-21. 
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Respondents next address appellants' justification for this 
invasion of minors' constitutional rights.201 The fundamental 
nature of the privacy interest at issue led the court of appeal 
to rule that the parental consent statute must further a com-
pelling interest.202 Respondents point out that the State had 
"failed completely to show that the burden ... was justi-
fied .... "203 Indeed, respondents argue, the statute would in-
jure state interests in protecting minors and maintaining the 
parent-child relationship.204 Thus, according to respondents, 
the parental consent statute's violation of the right to privacy 
is not justified, regardless of the standard of review. 205 
B. THE INDEPENDENCE OF CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 
Respondents further contend that California's constitution-
al jurisprudence has long been independent from federal doc-
trine, particularly in the area of the right to privacy and repro-
ductive rights.206 Because the California right to privacy has 
201. See id. at 21. Following establishment of the prima facie violation of the 
right to privacy, Hill requires defendants to demonstrate that countervailing inter-
ests justify the invasion of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 655-56. 
202. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 16, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents quote the Hill mlijority opinion: "Where 
the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal au-
tonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue con-
sensual familial relationships, a 'compelling interest' must be present to overcome 
the vital privacy interest." Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 653). Respondents also 
cite Justice Kennard's separate opinion in Hill: "[T)he mlijority recognizes and 
accepts the existing law that in appropriate circumstances the compelling interest 
standard continues to be applicable to governmental invasions of privacy rights, 
and holds that the compelling interest test must be applied when the interest 
invaded is fundamental to personal autonomy." Id. at 17 (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 
670 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in the judgment». 
203. Id. at 21 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
550). 
204. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 21, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents note: "In unusually forceful terms, the 
[lower) courts agreed that the statute would damage California youth and their 
families." Id. 
205. Id. at 22. Respondents note: "These findings are fatal to the constitutional-
ity of the statute, even under a deferential standard of review." Id. 
206. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respon-
dents point out that California had recognized that the right to choose whether to 
obtain an abortion constituted a fundamental right four years before the United 
States Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
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been viewed by the California Supreme Court as providing 
more protection than its federal counterpart,207 respondents 
argue that holdings from federal cases cannot be substituted 
for the independent judgment of California's courts. 208 Ac-
cording to respondents, the Privacy Initiative's addition of an 
explicit right to privacy to the California Constitution indicates 
that California's right to privacy is not co-extensive with the 
federal right, but is, in fact, broader.209 
C. ADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Respondents also argue that the current system adequate-
ly addresses the state's interests in protecting minors.2lo Cur-
rently, physicians must ascertain whether any patient is capa-
ble of giving informed consent before performing any surgical 
procedures.211 This ethical requirement extends to minors 
seeking abortions.212 Furthermore, respondents argue that 
(1973). [d. (citing People v. Belou8, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969». 
207. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993) (holding that 
the California Constitution. has been construed to provide California citizens with 
broader privacy protections encompassing procreative decisionmaking than are 
recognized by the United States Constitution); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights 
v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783 n.4 (Cal. 1981) (holding that California's explicit right 
to privacy is broader than the implied federal right). 
208. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 24-25, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents argue: "The State's effort to import feder-
al privacy standards wholesale and without analysis into the California Constitu-
tion .manifests a fundamental disregard for the independence of state constitutional 
law in our federal system." [d. 
209. [d. at 26-27. Respondents point out: "This court did not derive Hill's three-
step analysis from federal precedent, and indeed, no federal case has applied such 
an approach to claims based on the implicit right to privacy in the United States 
Constitution." [d. Furthermore, respondents note, Hill removes the state action 
requirement that is still required under federal jurisprudence. [d. at 26 (citing 
Hill, 865 P.2d at 649 n.8). Respondents state: "Hill's central holding establishes 
that the California constitutional right to privacy is broader than and independent 
of the implicit right to privacy in the United States Constitution." Respondents' 
Answer to Petition for Review at 26, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
A058627). 
210. Respondents' Brief at 26-27, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents explained: "Re-
spondents proffered substantial evidence at trial demonstrating that the current 
system of reproductive health care and counseling adequately protects minors with-
out transgressing their privacy rights." [d. 
211. See id. at 27-29. 
212. [d. at 29. 
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physicians are better situated than judges to evaluate minors' 
decision-making ability.213 Moreover, respondents point out 
that under the current system, physicians and counselors com-
monly advise minors to consult parents about reproductive 
choices.214 Thus, respondents argue, the status quo does a 
better job than the parental consent statute at furthering the 
state's interests, without infringing upon minors' privacy inter-
ests.215 
D. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Additionally, respondents argue, the parental consent 
statute violates minors' right to informational privacy.216 Re-
spondents claim that the parental consent statute requires 
that minors disclose intimate information regarding their "sex-
uality, pregnancy, and decision to choose abortion" to judicial 
officials.217 This information, normally the province of only 
the minor and medical professionals, would be gathered and 
stored as a regular part of judicial record-keeping.218 Because 
213. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 22, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents contrast the system created by the stat-
ute with the status quo: 
[d. 
The State admits that the law will force the majority of 
adolescents to navigate through a stressful court proceed-
ing that will delay access to abortion and thus subject 
them to a more complicated and potentially risky proce-
dure . . . . The State does not dispute that the doctors 
and counselors who serve California's young people pro-
vide sensitive guidance to pregnant teenagers, assisting 
them to make sound reproductive decisions, encouraging 
them to consult their parents or other family members, 
and ensuring that they provide informed consent to the 
medical services they elect. 
214. [d. at 22. 
215. Respondents' Brief at 29, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
Respondents argued: "Thus, because the State failed to show either that the stat-
ute protects minors or that no means less invasive of minors' rights, such as the 
present system, exist, the State failed to meet both aspects of its burden of proof." 
[d. 
216. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27, American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). 
217. [d. 
218. [d. At the court of appeal, respondents argued: "The state-coerced disclo-
sure of sensitive medical and reproductive information to the government, and its 
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the lower courts ruled that the parental consent statute fur-
thers no legitimate state interest, respondents argue, mandato-
ry disclosure of this sort of information cannot be justified.219 
E. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES EQUAL 
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
Lastly, respondents maintain that pregnant minors seek-
ing an abortion and those seeking medical care in connection 
with the decision to bring their pregnancies to term are simi-
larly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis.220 
Respondents argue: "In the dimensions identified by the State, 
the two reproductive options are equivalent. Both require 
early access to health care and are profoundly important life 
choices."221 Because the parental consent statute treats these 
two groups disparately, respondents contend that it violates 
the right to equal protection under California's Constitu-
tion.222 
VII. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
In deciding whether the parental consent statute 
impermissibly violates minors' constitutional rights to privacy 
and equal protection, the California Supreme Court will weigh 
the aforementioned arguments.223 In this analysis, the su-
preme court's primary task will be to evaluate the statute 
under prior judicial interpretations of the California Constitu-
tion.224 Such an analysis, independent of sweeping United 
indefinite retention in official files, plainly constitute a prima facie violation of the 
California Constitution's guarantee of informational privacy." Respondents' Brief at 
49-50, .American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
219. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy of 
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). As respondents argued at the court of appeal, "the 
State failed to show that a statute forcing thousands of pregnant adolescents to 
juvenile court every year, and the creation of official abortion docket files, will 
promote any of the Legislature's stated objectives." Respondents' Brief at 51, Amer· 
ican Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
220. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). 
221. [d. at 28. 
222. [d. 
223. See supra notes 125-79 and accompanying text for appellants' arguments. 
See supra notes 181-222 and accompanying text for respondents' arguments. 
224. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy 
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States Supreme Court generalizations, should lead the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to reject the parental consent statute .. A 
pragmatic evaluation of the statute's likely impact leads to a 
similar conclusion; the statute simply would not accomplish its 
purported goals. Unfortunately, the parental consent statute 
would more likely have a disastrous effect upon those minors 
whom it regulates. Based upon such a constitutional and prag-
matic review, the California Supreme Court should affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeal and maintain the permanent 
injunction against enforcement of the parental consent statute. 
A. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONSIDER 
EVIDENCE OF THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE'S 
INEFFICACY 
Appellants' argument, that the legislature's rational belief 
that a statute will further its goals sustains the statute from 
any facial challenge,225 clashes with both California jurispru-
dence and common sense.226 Particularly in the face of the 
"overwhelming evidence,,227 that the parental consent statute 
would in fact harm the state's interests, the California Su-
preme Court must consider appellants' failure to show ade-
of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), re-
view granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Respondents con-
tend: "California Courts have long recognized a special duty to construe 
California's constitutional provisions independent of any comparable federal rights, 
especially in the area of individual liberties." Id. 
225. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See supra notes 133-
39 for a discussion of appellants' argument. 
226. See Respondents' Brief at 5, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents refuted 
appellants' argument at the court of appeal: "No principle of constitutional law 
supports the State's extraordinary argument that this court must accept as conclu-
sively true legislative assumptions that the State could not defend at trial, that 
the trial court found to be false, and that even now the State does not try to 
justify." Id. Nevertheless, appellants renew this argument before the California 
Supreme Court. The author hopes that the state's highest court will be at least as 
concerned as the court of appeal with the real-world impact of the parental con-
sent statute's invasion of California citizens' fundamental rights. 
227. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-62, app. 
See supra note 204 and accompanying text for discussion of respondents' argu-
ments regarding the evidence presented at trial. See infra notes 233-53 and ac-
companying text for the author's analysis of the significance of the evidence that 
the statute will in fact harm the state's interests. 
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quate justification for such an intrusive statute.228 
More specifically, the fundamental nature of the right 
involved obliges the California Supreme Court to consider the 
evidence presented at trial and accepted by the court of ap-
pea1.229 In each of the supporting cases appellants cite, the 
interest involved was less than fundamental. 230 The right to 
choose whether to obtain an abortion, however, is "clearly 
among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional 
rights. "231 The California Supreme Court has held that "the 
ordinary deference a court owes to any legislative action van-
ishes when constitutionally protected rights are threat-
ened. "232 Thus, the California Supreme Court should ac-
knowledge the evidence introduced at trial concerning the 
efficacy of the parental consent statute. 
228. Despite the strength of the evidence presented at trial, appellants ask the 
California Supreme Court to rely on legislative assumptions as to the efficacy of 
the statute. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pedi-
atrics 11 (No. S041459). 
As respondents pointed out to the court of appeal: "This Court thus 'would 
abandon [its] constitutional duty if [it] took at face value' the legislature's justifica-
tions for the statute." Respondents' Brief at 6, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 
(No. A058627) (quoting Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa, 703 
P.2d 1119, 1126 (Cal. 1985». 
229. Respondents' Brief at 4-8, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No. 
A058627). Because the challenged law burdens California citizens' fundamental 
rights, the supreme court cannot unquestioningly accept empirically untrue legisla-
tive assumptions. On the contrary, the supreme court must affirmatively evaluate 
whether the sacrifice of fundamental rights is actually justified. [d. at 6. 
230. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 20, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 
(No. S041459) (citing People v. Mistriel, 241 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Cal. 1952) (legisla-
ture may pass law classifying marijuana as "narcotic"); People v. Oatis, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 524, 528 (Ct. App. 1968) (legislature may pass law prohibiting possession of 
marijuana despite disputed evidence as to its danger); and National Org. for Re-
form of Marijuana Laws v. Gain, 161 Cal. Rptr. 181, 184-85 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(courts properly defer to legislative discretion when scientific debate exists as to 
health risks of marijuana». 
231. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 j..2d 779, 793 (Cal. 
1981). The California Supreme Court held that, "under article I, section 1 of the 
California Constitution all women in this state rich and poor alike possess a fun-
damental constitutional right to choose whether or not to bear a child." [d. at 784. 
232. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1126 (fortune-telling is pro-
tected free speech). 
41
Grimm: Parental Consent for Minor's Abortion
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
504 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW lVol. 25:463 
B. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE WOULD HARM THE 
STATE'S INTERESTS 
It is bitterly ironic that the parental consent statute, os-
tensibly passed to protect minors from their "special vulnera-
bilities," would in fact injure minors' emotional and physical 
well-being if implemented.233 Minors typically suffer no 
longterm psychological or physical effects from choosing to 
obtain an abortion;234 rather, the most common reaction to an 
abortion among both minors and adults is relief.235 Evidence 
shows that abortion is a medically safe procedure which is far 
safer than carrying a pregnancy to term.238 
1. The Parental Consent Statute Would Endanger Minors' 
Physical and Emotional Well-Being 
The statute's requirements would likely result in delayed 
abortions for many teenagers due to scheduling of the judicial 
bypass procedure.237 Any delay increases the physical dan-
233. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 550 
(Ct. App. 1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 
1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 
247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court of appeal noted: "The evidence was nothing 
less than overwhelming that the legislation would not protect these interests, and 
would in fact injure the asserted interests of the health of minors and the parent-
child relationship." Id. 
234. See id. at 559 app. The court stated: "[T)he evidence was that minors who 
choose to undergo abortion experience a sense of self-esteem and sense of control 
equal to, and ultimately greater than, that experienced by those who choose to 
carry to term." Id. 
235. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, No. 884-574, slip op. at 7 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. June 5, 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. 
A058627), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). The 
trial court reviewed extensive findings from witnesses representing "a wide range 
of disciplines." See id. The court noted: "Both the American Psychological Associa-
tion and the American Psychiatric Association have thoroughly reviewed the pub-
lished research in this area and have concluded that for most women, abortion 
poses no threat to their psychological or emotional well-being." Id. 
236. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 app. 
"[T]eenage girls are 24 times as likely to die of childbirth as of a first-trimester 
abortion .... " Margaret Carlson, Abortion's Hardest Cases: Should Parents Have 
a Say in a Teenager's Decision to End her Pregnancy? Do Rape Victims Have Spe-
cial Rights? In the Supreme Court and in Louisiana, the Abortion Battle Lines are 
Redefined, TIME, Jul. 9, 1990, at 22. 
237. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 
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gers involved in obtaining an abortion.238 Testimony at trial 
further indicated that the judicial bypass procedure is extreme-
ly stressful for minors.239 Thus, through delay and added 
stress, the parental consent statute would endanger the physi-
cal and emotional well-being of minors.24o 
2. Parent-Child Relationships Would Be Injured by the 
Parental Consent Statute 
The parental consent statute would likely injure the par-
ent-child relationship.241 Cutting to the root of the issue, the 
court of appeal noted that "the decision by the minor not to 
involve a parent in the abortion decision does not lead to a 
poor familial relationship, but is the result of a poor familial 
relationship. "242 Appellants' argument, that the statute is 
561-62 app. (Ct. App. 1994). The court of appeal noted: "Minors in states having 
parental consent statutes delay the decision to undergo an abortion; the percentage 
of delayed abortions therefore increases following the implementation of such legis-
,lation." 1d. 
1d. 
238. See id. at 562 app. The court of appeal explained: 
The medical risks of abortion, however, increase as a 
pregnancy advances. Any delay in obtaining an abortion 
caused by the minor's reluctance to go through with the 
judicial bypass procedure, accordingly, is potentially injuri-
ous to her health. From this evidence, it follows that the 
implementation of A.B. 2274 will harm at least one of the 
interests the legislation is intended to further: the physi-
cal well-being of the minor. 
239. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556. The court 
of appeal explained that plaintiffs evidence at trial showed that, "forcing an un-
willing minor to disclose her decision to abort to a parent or judge causes extreme 
stress .... " 1d. 
240. See id. at 562 app. The court of appeal summarized: "The result is that 
the evidence disclosed that the judicial bypass is a costiy, unwieldy and essentially 
pointless procedure which achieves no purpose other than to cause stress to mi-
nors and delay the implementation of their decision to abort, thus rendering the 
abortion more dangerous." 1d. 
241. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 561 
app. (Ct. App. 1994). The court of appeal noted: "[T)he evidence was that compel-
ling a minor to consult a parent about an abortion decision cannot aid, and in 
many instances will in fact injure, the parent-child relationship." 1d. 
242. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560 app. The natu-
ral implication of the court of appeal's observation is that the statute will have its 
primary impact on minors in precisely the sort of families which would pose the 
greatest physical and emotional danger. The court of appeal stated: "Plaintiffs 
presented evidence that a significant number of families are abusive or otherwise 
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needed so supportive parents can assist their daughter in her 
decision,243 loses sight of the fact that supportive families 
have no need for a coercive statute to encourage communica-
tion.244 
Unfortunately, the parental consent statute would have its 
primary impact on minors in families which are not so sup-
portive.245 In the context of those families, appellants' view of 
the parental consent statute's impact is unrealistic; despite the 
legislature's best efforts, "[iJt is unlikely that politicians could 
write laws to improve communications in unhappy families, or 
keep teenagers from becoming pregnant, or provide wise and 
caring parents when they do."246 In fact, rigidly mandating 
communication between family members can lead to deadly 
results.247 The potential danger to minors posed by the paren-
dysfunctional. In a substantial number of these families, adolescent girls are at a 
particular risk for violence." 1d. at 561 app. 
243. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-10, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). 
244. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 26-27, American Acade-
my of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Re-
spondents observe: 
1d. at 23-24. 
The law does not affect the majority of California fami-
lies, in which the supportive relationship that has devel-
oped over years ensures that young women facing problem 
pregnancies will confide in their parents without govern-
ment compulsion. Rather, the law affects the remaining 
teenagers, who live in families' which cannot bear the 
stress of the news of a daughter's pregnancy. 
245. See id. Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe describes the unfortunate 
impracticalities of parental consent statutes: 
In families where real communication goes on, such laws 
are redundant or insulting. And in families where commu-
nication has broken down, such laws are unlikely to facili-
tate respectful dialogue between children in crisis and 
their parents. Perhaps a statute could successfully legis-
late a 'right' for parents to control a daughter's decision 
and to force an unwilling child to carry a fetus to 
term . . . . But no statute could realistically hope to 
legislate love or communication between parents and chil-
dren. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 209 (1992). 
246. Carlson, supra note 236, at 22. 
247. One shocking incident illustrates the seriousness of the threat of violence 
to young women in dysfunctional families: in Idaho, a thirteen year-old girl was 
shot to death by her father when he learned that he had impregnated her. See 
TRIBE, supra note 245, at 202-03 (citing Margie Boule, An American Tragedy, 
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tal consent statute is serious and should not be underestimat-
ed. 
3. The Parental Consent Statute Would Not Reduce Teen 
Pregnancy 
Appellants argued at the court of appeal that the statute 
would reduce teen pregnancy.248 Appellants had introduced 
evidence at trial demonstrating that teen pregnancy rates 
decreased in states which had similar parental consent stat-
utes.249 Other rational explanations exist for such statistics, 
however.25o Although evidence shows that abortion rates 
dropped in those states, actual pregnancy rates remained 
steady.251 Thus, rather than reducing the pregnancy rate, the 
primary impact of parental consent statutes was to send mi-
nors across state lines to obtain abortions in states without 
such restrictive laws.252 Furthermore, during the same time 
period, the pregnancy rate also dropped in states without pa-
rental consent laws.253 
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 27, 1989, at E1). 
248. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 561 
app. (Ct. App. 1994). 
249. See id. In Minnesota, Missouri, and Massachusetts, the teen pregnancy 
rate dropped following implementation of parent consent laws. See id. 
250. See id. at 561 app. The court of appeal noted: "Plaintiffs, however, coun-
tered with evidence that in each instance the pregnancy rate had dropped for 
other reasons." See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text for respondents' 
alternative explanations. 
251. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d at 561 app. 
252. See id. The trial court explained: "One study published in 1986 in the 
American Journal of Public Health by Virginia Cartoof, Ph.D., and Lorraine 
Klerman, D.P.H., concluded that after the Massachusetts consent law went into 
effect, an average of 90 to 95 pregnant minors traveled out of that state each 
month to obtain an abortion." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 
884-574, slip. op. at 17 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992). 
253. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561 app. Evi-
dence showed that in Missouri, the teen pregnancy rate had begun to drop before 
the statute went into place, and that in Minnesota, the adult pregnancy rate also 
dropped during the same time period. American Academy of Pediatrics II, No. 884-
574, slip op. at 16. 
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C. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE FAILS TO FuRTHER A 
COMPELLING INTEREST 
The failure of the statute to further any stated interest 
makes an inquiry as to the proper standard of review practical-
ly moot.254 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court 
should apply the compelling interest test.2M Under the three-
part test mandated by Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n,256 the parental consent statute violates minors' consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy.257 Because the right to 
privacy involves a vital autonomy interest,25s Hill requires 
254. Even if appellants are correct in arguing that a statute regulating minors 
need only be supported by significant state interests, the parental consent statute 
still must be rejected. Appellants consistently fail to address the parental consent 
statute's crucial inadequacy; the statute simply does not further any of the state's 
interests. 
255. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 
549-50 (Ct. App. 1994). The "compelling interest test," as applied by the court of 
appeal, requires that the State demonstrate that a compelling interest be furthered 
by the parental consent statute, that the burden upon privacy rights be justified 
by the benefits from the statute, and that those benefits could not be gained by 
less burdensome means. See id. 
256. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). 
257. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hill's 
three-part test. The State's arguments on the specific elements of the Hill test are 
mostly off-point; rather than arguing that there is no protected privacy interest in-
volved, appellants argue that, according to United States Supreme Court decisions, 
parents also have an interest. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-35, American 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. 
S041459). Rather than asserting that minors have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their reproductive decision-making, appellants argue that, according to 
federal jurisprudence, minors' expectations are less reasonable than those of adults. 
See id. at 35-37. Finally, rather than contending that the parental consent 
statute's invasion of the right to privacy is not serious, appellants simply incorpo-
rate the arguments from the first two elements. See id. at 37-38. 
Conversely, respondents confront each element specifically and effectively: 
minors' right to privacy is protected by the California constitution as interpreted 
by California courts. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17-19, 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(No. A058627). Distinguishing minors who would be regulated by this statute from 
the voluntary athletes at issue in Hill, respondents argue that minors' reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not diminished by any voluntary course of action, such as 
joining a sports team. See id. at 19-20. Finally, respondents note that the invasion 
of the right to privacy is serious. The parental consent statute is "a law depriving 
young women of their ability to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, enforced 
by the State's most coercive authority, criminal sanctions." [d. at 20. Respondents' 
serious discussion of the Hill elements establishes the prima facie violation of the 
constitutional right. 
258. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553. The court 
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the State to justify the invasion by demonstrating the further-
ance of a compelling interest.259 
The California Supreme Court should affirm the lower 
courts' rulings; the parental consent statute fails to meet the 
compelling interest standard,260 and thus, unconstitutionally 
infringes upon minors' right to privacy. 
D. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The parental consent statute also violates minors' constitu-
tionally protected right. to informational privacy.261 The re-
cords compiled by juvenile courts implementing the statute 
would consist of private information regarding minors' sexual 
and gynecological history.262 Appellants' principal argument 
of appeal noted that in cases "involving an invasion of an interest fundamental to 
personal autonomy, a compelling state interest must be present to overcome the 
vital privacy interest." [d. (citing Hill, 865 P.2d at 653). 
259. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 653. The California Supreme Court stated: "Where 
the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal au-
tonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue con-
sensual familial relationships, a 'compelling interest' must be present to overcome 
the vital privacy interest." [d. 
260. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558. The court 
of appeal explained: 
[d. 
As we have stated, however, it is not enough for the 
Legislature to assert a compelling state interest as justifi-
cation for the legislation; it also must show that the legis-
lation will in fact further that interest. The trial court 
concluded, and we agree, that A.B. 2274 will not protect 
the health and welfare of minors, will not foster the par-
ent-child relationship, and will provide only little, if any, 
support for any interest in involving parents in the deci-
sions of their children. 
261. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. at 
31 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992). The trial court held: 
[d. 
With respect to Plaintiffs' additional argument that A.B. 
2274 violates minors' rights to informational privacy, also 
guaranteed by article I, section 1, it follows from this 
Court's finding that the legislation itself furthers no com-
pelling interest, that the State cannot demonstrate a 
compelling interest in maintaining records created solely 
to effectuate the procedures provided therein. 
262. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27, American Academy 
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is that the invasion of privacy is no more extensive than neces-
sary.263 Because the parental consent statute serves no state 
interests, however, no infringement of the right to information-
al privacy is justified.264 Thus, the California Supreme Court 
should affirm the trial court's holding that the parental con-
sent statute unconstitutionally violates informational privacy 
rights.266 
E. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Finally, the parental consent statute violates the Califor-
nia Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.266 Appel-
lants argue that minors seeking prenatal or delivery care and 
those seeking abortions are not similarly situated, so the 
statute's disparate treatment of these groups is permissi-
ble.267 
Appellants contend that there are no public interests in a 
minor's right to obtain an abortion, but that there are public 
interests in a minor's right to obtain prenatal or delivery 
care.26B Appellants assert that choosing to obtain an abortion 
of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). 
Respondents argue: "This sensitive information, normally shared with medical 
professionals, will be recorded in court files and stored indefinitely.ft ld. 
263. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 39, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). "The minimal collec· 
tion of data in furtherance of a compelling state interest does not violate a right 
of privacy even of adults." ld. (citing People ex rei. Eichenberger v. Stockton Preg-
nancy Control Medical Clinic, 249 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Ct. App. 1988». 
264. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27-28, American Acade· 
my of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627). 
265. Because the informational privacy argument constituted an independent 
. ground for the trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction against the statute, 
it could be addressed by the California Supreme Court. The author notes, however, 
that if the supreme court were to strike down the parental consent statute as a 
violation of autonomy privacy, it is likely that the court would not reach the issue 
of informational privacy. 
266. The author believes that the California Supreme Court will strike down 
the parental consent statute on privacy grounds; thus, the author believes, the su-
preme court will most likely not reach the issue of equal protection. See supra 
note 265. 
267. Appellants' Opening Brief at 45, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). 
268. ld. at 41. Appellants assert: "[T)he health risks involved [in delaying an 
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involves moral issues, whereas obtaining prenatal care in con-
nection with bringing a pregnancy to term involves no such 
moral issues.269 
Despite appellants' arguments to the contrary, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court should recognize that the parental consent 
statute treats two similarly situated groups disparately.270 
Appellants' contentions, that a minor's right to privacy involves 
no public interest and that the decision to bring a pregnancy to 
term involves no moral decision-making,271 illustrate the 
depth of appellants' misperception of the real-world issues at 
stake in this case. Both groups have a constitutionally protect-
ed privacy interest in their reproductive choice.272 By apply-
ing the most coercive method available in regulating one 
group, while leaving the other group unregulated, the parental 
consent statute violates equal protection principles.273 
abortion in order to obtain parental consent) are personal to the minor and there 
are no public health reasons for not requiring parental consent." 1d. at 42. Howev-
er, the court of appeal recognized that the longer the decision to obtain an abor-
tion is delayed, the more dangerous the procedure becomes for minors. American 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 562 (Ct. App. 1994). The 
author believes that the danger the statute poses to the physical safety of young 
women of California constitutes precisely the sort of "public health reason" that 
justifies minors' current ability to obtain an abortion without third party consent. 
269. Appellant's Opening Brief at 44, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. 
S041459). Appellants argue: "Abortion involves moral decision making and that 
element of the equation is well recognized by our highest courts. The decisions 
involved in obtaining prenatal or delivery care simply are not recognized as involv-
ing such moral questions." 1d. Appellants apparently consider the decision to be-
come a parent devoid of any moral or ethical component. 
Respondents counter: "However, there is an ethical dimension to any deci-
sion about pregnancy-whether the decision is to terminate an unplanned pregnan-
cy by abortion or to bear a child and become a parent." Respondents' Brief at 58, 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(No. A058627). The author agrees with respondents: because both groups have 
ethical decisions to make, the statute violates equal protection by regulating only 
one group. See id. 
270. Respondents' Brief at 51, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
271. See supra notes 176-79 for a discussion of appellants' arguments. 
272. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy 
of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents argue that, "the government is re-
quired to justify using its criminal law to place a disproportionate legal burden on 
one of two constitutionally protected reproductive choices." [d. 
273. Respondents' Brief at 52, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). 
Respondents argue: 
The State's disparate legal requirement for two alternative 
medical responses to pregnancy bears no relation to the 
consequences of each reproductive option, but reflects the 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
California's parental consent statute, which has so far 
been rejected by every judicial evaluation, violates the Califor-
nia Constitution. The statute endangers young women's physi-
cal and emotional health and threatens to compel these minors 
to bear children against their will. Appellants argue that the 
California Supreme Court should disregard the State's failure 
to prove that the parental consent statute would bring about 
any of its stated benefits. Instead, appellants contend, the 
supreme court should follow the "brilliant illumination" provid-
ed by opinions of the United States Supreme Court interpret-
ing the United States Constitution.274 To do so, the California 
Supreme Court would have to disregard the independence of 
California's Constitution, ignore the weight of precedent from 
California cases, and neglect the safety and well-being of thou-
sands of California's young women. 
[d. 
Michael Grimm· 
government's ideological preference for childbirth over 
abortion. The State has imposed an elaborate consent 
requirement as a barrier to the disfavored reproductive 
choice of abortion. By using the criminal laws to influence 
teenagers to acquiesce in the state-favored alternative of 
childbearing, regardless of their personal aspirations, the 
government has violated the California Constitution's 
guarantees of privacy and equality. 
274. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 33, American Academy of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459); see supra notes 158-60 
and accompanying text for a discussion of appellants' suggestion. 
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